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ABSTRACT This paper examines national-level family policies in a comparative perspective, to see
whether they “crowd out” company-level family-friendly policies, namely schedule control. Further,
it examines whether this relationship varies for different types of family policies, and for different
groups of workers – i.e. distinguished by gender, parenthood status and skill divisions. The paper
uses data from 27 European countries in 2010, and applies multilevel random slopes models with
cross-level interaction terms. Results show that generous national-level family policies, in particular
work-facilitating policies, “crowd in” company-level schedule control provisions, especially for
high-skilled workers. However, very generous leave entitlements seem to crowd out schedule control
provision.
Keywords: company-level; national-level; crowding out; multilevel random slopes model;
comparative family policies; schedule control
Introduction
Many studies examine the cross-national variation of family policies or the extent to which
policies support a dual-earner/carer system (e.g. Crompton 2006; Lewis et al. 2008; Korpi
et al. 2013) with much of the focus on comparing national-level policies across different
countries. Although national-level policies are important when examining the support
available for parents, it is also crucial to examine the meso- and micro-levels (see also,
Abrahamson 2007; Kvist and Greve 2011). On the one hand, companies may effectively
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restrict the access to the existing national-level regulations (Bygren and Duvander 2006),
ultimately deﬁning the “ﬁnal availability” of arrangements workers actually have (Chung
and Tijdens 2013). On the other hand, companies may provide additional arrangements
which may not be set out in national-level agreements to address various needs arising from
the company (Farnsworth 2004). Employers have their own incentives for providing
additional family-friendly arrangements, i.e. to help ensure the recruitment and maintenance
of workers with additional family demands (Dex and Scheibl 2001; Wood et al. 2003), and/
or to increase performance outcomes (Swanberg et al. 2005; Ortega 2009).
This paper examines the relationship between national-level and company-level
family policies in a comparative perspective using data from 27 European countries.
“Crowding out” theory (Etzioni 1995) argues that generous national-level social policy
programmes “‘crowd out’ informal caring relations and social networks, as well as
familial, communal and occupational systems of self-help and reciprocity” (Van
Oorschot and Arts 2005, p. 6). Based on this theory, in countries where generous
national-level family policies exist, companies will not be willing, or may not feel a
need, to provide company-level policies to address workers’ family demands. On the
other hand, others (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Künemund and Rein 1999; Davis
and Kalleberg 2006) argue that generous policies at the national level can encourage
companies to provide more generous policies.
Although some studies have examined this issue (see the next section for a review), they are
limited in that most examine family policies as a unidimensional concept, and assume an
equal impact of policies across the population. Family policies are multi-dimensional and
provide different functions (Misra et al. 2011). In addition, access to company-level policies
are not equal across all workers (Swanberg et al. 2005) and divisions in the labour market vary
across different institutional settings (Schwander and Häusermann 2013; Chung 2016). This
paper thus contributes to the existing literature by examining the relationship between
national-level family policies and access workers have to additional company-level family-
friendly policies in a comparative perspective. More speciﬁcally, it distinguishes between
different types of family policies, and distinguishes the effect of these policies across different
groups in the labour market. Following the literature on unequal access to family-friendly
policies (e.g. Swanberg et al. 2005; Brescoll et al. 2013; Munsch 2016), this paper focuses on
divisions across gender, parenthood status and skill levels.
Of the various arrangements provided at the company level, this paper will focus on
workers’ perceived access to schedule control, i.e. the control they have over their work
schedules. Along with part-time working, schedule control is one of the most commonly
provided and used arrangements at the company level to better balance work with family
life (Gornick and Heron 2006; Eurofound 2010; Chung 2017). One reason for its frequent
use is because it can be used to enhance company performance, as well as address
workers’ family demands (Ortega 2009; Chung and Tijdens 2013). Further, unlike part-
time work, it is less likely to lead to negative career consequences (McGinnity and
McManus 2007), with potential for income and career premiums (Leslie et al. 2012;
Lott and Chung 2016). Lastly, the right to reduce working hours, i.e. working part-time, is
more strictly regulated by law in many countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands
(Hegewisch 2009), while until very recently the right to schedule control was not
provided as a particularly strong legal right in Europe.1 This makes schedule control





























The next section explains what is meant by schedule control, the varying access to it
across different groups, and examines the theories on the relationship between national-
level policies and company-level provisions. The following section examines the data,
variables used, as well as the methodologies applied in the paper. The fourth section will
present the analysis results, followed by some ﬁnal concluding remarks and suggestions
for future studies.
Theories, Deﬁnition
What Is Schedule Control?
The concept of schedule control builds on the job demands–control model developed by
Karasek (1979), but focuses on the control over when work is done rather than how it is
done (Kelly and Moen 2007). More speciﬁcally, it entails a worker’s ability to change the
timing of their work (that is, to alternate the starting and ending times – i.e. ﬂexitime), and
in some cases, the ability to change the number of hours worked per day or week, up to a
worker having complete control over their working hours (working-time autonomy).
Work‒family border theory (Clark 2000) and ﬂexibility enactment theory (Kossek et al.
2005) suggest that having control over one’s work schedule can help facilitate the
integration of work and home roles. Schedule control provides workers with control
over the time border between work and family, allowing workers to adapt the timing of
work around family demands (Clark 2000). Especially given that normal ﬁxed working
hours (e.g. 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.) and family schedules/demands (e.g. school pick-up times at
3:30 p.m.) are not necessarily compatible, the control over when you work can help
workers resolve some of the conﬂict arising from this incompatibility. There is evidence to
show that having control over their work and more speciﬁcally having schedule control
can help relieve workers’ work‒family conﬂict, that is the conﬂict between the demands
of the work and home spheres (e.g. Chung 2011; Allen et al. 2013; Kelly et al. 2014).
However, schedule control is not only used to address workers’ family demands, but
also to enhance performance (Ortega 2009). Schedule control can be used as a part of a
high-involvement system (Wood and de Menezes 2010) or high-performance strategy,
which believes that allowing workers more discretion and inﬂuence over their work can
help improve performance (Davis and Kalleberg 2006). In fact, studies have shown that
workers increase their work intensity and working hours when using schedule control
(Kelliher and Anderson 2010; Lott and Chung 2016), and accordingly it can lead to
income premiums for workers (Leslie et al. 2012) and better performance outcomes for
employers (de Menezes and Kelliher 2011).
Who Has Access to Schedule Control?
Who has access to schedule control will depend on the company’s main purpose for
introducing the policy. Swanberg et al. (2005) discuss three principles in which these can
take form: principles of need, equity and equality. When employers are genuinely inter-
ested in addressing the work‒family needs of workers, those with most family demands
are likely to get access to the arrangements. In this case, we could expect parents/workers
with care responsibilities to be more likely to have access to schedule control. This will
particularly be the case for parents with young children, given the amount of care required



























in the early years of a child’s life. Women still take, and are expected to take, the bulk of
responsibility for household tasks and care (Eurofound 2013). Thus when schedule
control is provided based on the principle of need, women should have more access.
On the contrary, when employers are more interested in the enhanced performance
gained from introducing schedule control (principle of equity), those who are more likely
to be able to increase work intensity/hours or contribute to the organisation will have more
access (Swanberg et al. 2005). Furthermore, schedule control is more likely to be provided
as a reward to those in higher status, supervisory roles (Schieman et al. 2013), or as a part
of the increase in overall control these workers obtain over their work (Kelly and Kalev
2006). As employers hold discriminatory assumptions regarding women’s use of schedule
control – i.e. for family-friendly purposes (Brescoll et al. 2013), men are expected to and
in some cases actually do increase their work intensity more than women when using
schedule control (Lott and Chung 2016). This, along with the fact that organisational
hierarchies are gendered (Acker 1990), means that employers may be more likely to
provide schedule control to men when the principle of equity is prioritised in deciding
who gets access to schedule control. Lastly, when the equality principle takes precedence,
access to schedule control will be provided to all workers equally regardless of their
family demands or performance outcome projections (Swanberg et al. 2005).
Empirically, the principle of equity has been shown to be the strongest determinant of
schedule control access. Those in high-skill positions, more highly educated workers and
workers at higher occupational levels are most likely to have access to schedule control
(Golden 2009; Ortega 2009; Brescoll et al. 2013). Workers in disadvantaged positions –
e.g. low wage, hourly paid, less well educated – are least likely to have such access (e.g.
Swanberg et al. 2005; Golden 2009). In addition, studies have shown that men are more
likely to have and be given access to schedule control (Golden 2009; Ortega 2009;
Minnotte et al. 2010; Lyness et al. 2012; Brescoll et al. 2013), even if the reason for
the access is for childcare purposes (Munsch 2016). Regarding parental status, there is
evidence that being a parent – especially of young children – increases the availability of
schedule control (Golden 2009; Minnotte et al. 2010), while others found parental status
to be insigniﬁcant (Swanberg et al. 2005; Ortega 2009).
Impact of Institutions
Despite the number of studies examining access to schedule control, few examine the role
national-level policies have in determining access to schedule control for workers in a
comparative perspective. Furthermore, how national-level family policies inﬂuence the
relative access different groups of workers have to schedule control is yet to be examined.
“Crowding out” theory argues that national-level policies will crowd out company-level
engagements (Etzioni 1995; van Oorschot and Arts 2005), i.e. companies will not be
willing to, or may not feel a need to, provide company-level family policies when there
are generous policies at the national level. However, this will not necessarily stop
companies from using schedule control for performance-enhancing purposes. Thus, fol-
lowing the “crowding out” assumption, we would expect the principle of equity to be
prevalent in countries with generous national-level family policies, with more highly
skilled workers, men and non-parents being more likely to have access to it.
The counter-argument to this comes from the “crowding in” theory (e.g. Künemund




























generous welfare policies and informal welfare – in particular intergenerational welfare.
Unfortunately, there is yet to be a “crowding in” theory that focuses on the relationship
between national-level policies and corporate family policies. However, institutional
theory provides us with some insights on these relationships. Institutional theory argues
that institutions, bureaucratic systems, laws and policies put pressure on organisations to
become similar to national institutions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Especially of interest
to this paper are the normative isomorphic pressures, i.e. national-level policies changing
the norm and subsequent public demand for companies to be more family-friendly (Den
Dulk et al. 2013), and mimetic pressures, i.e. where companies imitate or mimic the
practices of other organisations (Davis and Kalleberg 2006, pp. 199–202). Based on this
theory, we can expect that when there are generous national-level family policies, this will
raise the benchmark and change the culture companies operate in, making them more
likely to provide company-level family-friendly policies. This normative change may also
lead companies to follow the principle of need when providing schedule control, follow-
ing what is done at the national level. In this case, we would expect that in countries with
generous national-level family policies, employers will make schedule control more
readily available for workers with the most family demands. This would result in
women/parents having more access compared to men/non-parents. In addition, we
would observe a reduced gap between workers with different skill levels, since schedule
control would be given to workers regardless of their potential returns.
In sum, the hypotheses for this paper can be summed up as:
H1a: In countries with generous family policies at the national level, workers are less
likely to have access to schedule control (“crowding out”).
H1b: In countries with generous family policies at the national level, workers are more
likely to have access to schedule control (“crowding in”).
H2a: In countries with generous family policies at the national level, men/non-parents
and more highly skilled workers are more likely to have access to schedule control,
and a larger skill level/educational gap will be found (“crowding out”).
H2b: In countries with generous family policies at the national level, women/parents are
more likely to have access to schedule control and a smaller skill level/educational
gap will be found (“crowding in”).
Empirically, the results are varied. Some qualitative studies provide evidence of
“crowding out”: that is, in countries without much statutory family policy provision,
companies use family-friendly policies for staff retention or other strategic reasons (Den
Dulk 2005; Ollier-Malaterre 2009). On the contrary, studies using quantitative data of
companies have shown that company-level schedule control policies are more widespread
in countries where there are generous family policies at the national level (Den Dulk et al.
2013; Chung 2014). Others using individual-level quantitative data argue that there are no
clear relationships between statutory regulations and (extra) company-level provisions
(Kassinis and Stavrou 2013; Präg and Mills 2014), and only when there is a very large
involvement from the state can a “crowding out” impact be seen (Evans 2002). Only one
individual-level data study shows that family policies at the national level have a positive
impact on workers’ access to schedule control (Lyness et al. 2012).
The different results may be due to the different types of data used, but also due to the
different measurement of family policies at the national level – Evans (2002), Lyness et al.



























(2012), and Präg and Mills (2014) focus on leave policies, Kassinis and Stavrou (2013)
and Chung (2014) use family policy expenditure, while Den Dulk et al. (2013) use a
single composite indicator encompassing both leave policies and childcare provision.
However, efforts made by governments to support families are multi-dimensional and
can have very different impacts on work‒family outcomes (Misra et al. 2011), and do not
necessarily correlate with one another (Korpi 2000). Following the distinction made by
previous scholars (Korpi 2000; Misra et al. 2011; Korpi et al. 2013), this paper distin-
guishes family policies into three different types. Firstly, public expenditure on family
policies as a percentage of GDP indicates a general level of effort made at the national
level. Secondly, “work-reducing” measures (Misra et al. 2011) indicate the state’s provi-
sion of the right to provide care – allowing parents/mothers to stay at home during the
early years of a child’s life through parental leave. Lastly, “work-facilitating” measures
(Misra et al. 2011) indicate the extent to which the state encourages women’s labour
market participation/dual-earner system, for example through public childcare provisions.
Misra et al. (2011) note that while generous work-facilitating policies have a positive
inﬂuence on employment outcomes for women, extensive work-reducing policies such as
long leave entitlements may exacerbate the gender gap by enforcing “mommy tracks” ‒
easing mothers out of the markets. Similarly, I expect that work-facilitating measures will
be especially closely linked to the provision of schedule control. Only when childcare is
readily available can schedule control help parents/mothers back into work after childbirth
(see also Chung and van der Horst forthcoming). In countries with long leave entitle-
ments, having ﬂexibility in one’s schedule may not be as important since mothers/parents
will be on leave during these care-intensive years.
Another limitation to previous studies is that most do not examine how the impact of
institutions can vary for different groups in the labour market. To the author’s knowledge,
only two studies examine any variation. Den Dulk et al. (2013) show that generous family
policies at the national level increase the gap between companies in their provision of
schedule control; in countries with generous family policies, public and larger companies
are even better at providing schedule control. Lyness et al. (2012), on the other hand, do
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of generous paid in explaining the cross-national variance
of the gender gap in access to schedule control. More investigation is needed to see how




The European Working Conditions Survey collected by the European Foundation aims to
provide information on a number of dimensions regarding the working conditions of
workers across Europe. Individuals across 34 European countries were included in the
survey: the EU27 plus candidate countries. Of the sample, I make use of the data for the
EU27 countries. The survey was conducted in the ﬁrst half of 2010, where individuals
were interviewed using a face-to-face method at the respondent’s home. A random
stratiﬁed sampling procedure was used to gather a representative sample of those aged
15 or over and in employment at the time of the survey. The target sample for most




























rate was 44.2 per cent across all countries, ranging from 31 per cent (Spain) to 74 per cent
(Latvia). Of the total sample, I restrict the analysis to those in dependent employment, and
further exclude those in the armed forces, and in agriculture/ﬁsheries due to the speciﬁc
nature of these jobs. I also exclude those over 65 years of age. Further excluding cases
with missing values in any one of our variables results in a total of 23,234 cases across 27
countries. See http://eurofound.europa.eu/european-working-conditions-surveys-ewcs for
more on this survey.
Variables
The provision of schedule control has been measured through the following question
“How are your working time arrangements set?”, where the workers can answer: 1 –
“They are set by the company/organisation with no possibility for changes”; 2 – “You
can choose between several ﬁxed working schedules determined by the company/
organisation”; 3 – “You can adapt your working hours within certain limits (e.g.
ﬂexitime)”; and 4 – “Your working hours are entirely determined by yourself”.
Those who have answered 3 or 4 to this question are considered to have schedule
control. Note that we are examining access to schedule control, which is distinct from
the use of it (McNamara et al. 2012).
The key independent variables are gender; parental status, i.e. whether or not the
respondent lives with a child under 18 years of age, and whether the respondent lives
with a preschool child under 6 years of age; the worker’s skill level based on occupational
category as a continuous scale (professionals/managers = 3, associate professionals/
managers = 2, generally skilled/vocational = 1, and low/unskilled = 0) (see appendix
for detailed deﬁnitions);2 and education level measured through two dummies (tertiary or
above, upper and post-secondary (reference), primary and lower-secondary). Based on
previous studies (e.g. Chung 2009; Lyness et al. 2012; Präg and Mills 2014) I also include
age; whether the respondent lives with a partner; contract type; working hours; whether
the worker holds a supervisory role; existence of an employee representative at the
company; management support; gender of the direct manager; gender dominance of the
post; and ﬁnally the size and sector (public vs. private, as well as the line of business,
reference group: manufacturing) of the company the respondent works in.
Family policy is measured by three indicators. Firstly, general family-policy generosity
is measured through public expenditure on family policies as a percentage of GDP for the
year 2010 derived from EUROSTAT. Secondly, work-reducing family policy is measured
through effective parental leave, i.e. duration of the parental leave (including maternity or
paternity) multiplied by the income replacement rate throughout these months. This
variable is derived from the Multilinks data set, and is for the year 2009 due to the lack
of data for 2010. Thirdly, the proportion of children using formal childcare for age group
0–3 years for 2010 from EUROSTAT is used to indicate work-facilitating measures. I
choose childcare coverage of 0–3 instead of 3‒compulsory school age/6, for two reasons.
Firstly, the 0–3 age group demands more intensive childcare and thus is much harder to
provide, while it is most crucial in terms of allowing mothers to continue their labour
market commitment after childbirth (Korpi 2000). Secondly, the compulsory school age
varies widely across Europe (e.g. 4 for the UK, 7 for Finland) thus making the index
harder to compare, and similarly, in many cases childcare for 3–6 year olds is often
considered a part of the formal educational system for young children, rather than as



























policies to support mothers’ employment (Misra et al. 2011). See appendix for more
detailed information about the operationalisation of all variables.
Modelling Method
Two-level random-intercept/random-slope multilevel regression models are used for the
purposes of this paper. Multilevel modelling methods are used when data is clustered, and
contextual effects are taken into account (Hox 2002). Multilevel modelling assumes that
the lower-level sample – here individuals – is subject to the inﬂuences of groupings
(Rasbash et al. 2009), such as countries in this paper’s case. Firstly, before examining the
predictors of schedule control, the interclass correlation (ICC) is examined. The ICC
indicates the extent to which the variance of the dependent variable could be attributed to
the country level. Secondly, I include individual-level variables to see the inﬂuence of
individual (and company) characteristics that can explain workers’ access to schedule
control. Next, I include national-level variables in the model to explain the variance in the
access to schedule control found between countries, after taking into account the compo-
sition effect, e.g. the fact that different countries have different compositions of workers.
This allows us to test whether generous family policies at the national level inﬂuence
workers’ access to schedule control (H1). Afterwards, random slopes models are used to
test the varying impact of gender; parental status; skill level; and educational level across
different policy settings (H2). Through this approach, we are able to test whether the
gender gap (differences between men and women); parental status gap (difference
between parents and non-parents); skill gap (differences between higher and lower skilled
workers); and the educational gap (differences between more and less highly educated
workers) in the access to schedule control are equal across countries. A signiﬁcant
variance in the random slope entails that there are countries where these gaps are
signiﬁcantly different from the average gap found across Europe (coefﬁcients found for
the general model). For the variables with signiﬁcant variance in the random slope, I
include cross-level interaction terms with the family policy variables and the random slope
variables, to see whether the different types of national-level family policies can explain
some of this variation. Or to put it differently, we are testing whether the impact of family
policies vary across different segments of the labour market (see also Chung and Mau
2014). This allows us not only to examine whether national-level family policies “crowd
out” or “crowd in” access to company-level arrangements for the general population, but
also to see whether certain populations are targeted in this process. STATA 14.0 meqrlogit
is used for the analysis.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Looking at the national-level variation in the access to schedule control (Figure 1), on
average about 22 per cent of all workers have access. At ﬁrst glance, the positions of
countries in their average access to schedule control seem to reﬂect the existing family-
policy regime typologies. In Northern European countries, along with the Netherlands,
workers are more likely to have access to schedule control, with more than 40 per cent




























by Estonia, Slovenia, the UK and France, at least one in ﬁve workers have access to
schedule control. In Southern and some Eastern European countries, workers do not have
much access to schedule control, with less than 10 per cent having access in countries
such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Romania.
Multivariate Analysis
The ICC in the empty model without any controls is 22 per cent, indicating that just above
one-ﬁfth of the variance in the access to schedule control across all workers in our survey
is due to the country they live in. Table 1 provides the results of the multilevel analysis
including individual/company-level characteristics to explain access to schedule control.
Firstly, we examine the key variables of our interest, gender; parental status; skill; and
educational level. The gender of the respondent is not signiﬁcantly related to whether they
have access to schedule control, and nor is parental status. Workers with preschool
children are more likely to have access to schedule control, but the difference is rather
small. On the other hand, there is a signiﬁcant divide between workers of different skill
levels in their access to schedule control. The higher the respondent’s skill level and the
higher the respondent’s education level, the more likely that they will have access to
schedule control. On average, one step change upwards in the skill hierarchy increases
your likelihood of accessing schedule control by approximately 1.5 times. Similarly, those
with tertiary education are 1.6 times more likely than upper secondary educated workers
(the reference group), and more than twice as likely as primary/lower secondary educated
workers to have access to schedule control.
Figure1. Proportion of workers with access to schedule control across 27 European countries in
2010 Source: EWCS.







































































































































































































Table 1. Multilevel model explaining workers' access to schedule control across 27 European
countries in 2010
Model 1
B Std. E Odds
Female (ref: male) −0.008 0.047 1.008
Has a child <18 (ref: no children) 0.074 0.049 1.076
Has a preschool child <6 0.128* 0.064 1.136
Skill level (0 = low-skilled~3 = high-skilled) 0.426*** 0.026 1.531
Education (ref: upper secondary)
Primary or lower secondary −0.324*** 0.052 0.713
Tertiary or above 0.490*** 0.047 1.633
Controls
Age 0.011*** 0.002 1.011
Has a partner (ref: does not have a partner) −0.015 0.043 0.985
Open-ended contract (ref: not in open-ended) −0.104 0.054 0.901
Working hours 0.002 0.002 1.002
Supervisory role (ref: not in supervisory role) 0.425*** 0.049 1.530
Employee representative exists (ref: no ER) −0.049 0.042 0.952
Management support 0.128** 0.039 1.137
Boss woman (ref: boss man) −0.015 0.046 0.985
Gender dominance of job (ref: equal numbers)
Mostly men with the same job −0.213*** 0.051 0.808
Mostly women with the same job −0.332*** 0.050 0.717
Establishment size (ref: 500 or more)
Fewer than 10 −0.193** 0.073 0.825
10 to 49 −0.476*** 0.069 0.621
50 to 99 −0.379*** 0.079 0.684
100 to 249 −0.270*** 0.079 0.763
250 to 499 −0.021 0.092 0.979
Public company −0.317*** 0.052 0.723
Sector (ref: manufacturing)
Mining & quarrying −0.672** 0.313 0.511
Electricity, gas, water 0.472*** 0.143 1.603
Construction −0.069 0.093 0.933
Retail & wholesale 0.055 0.071 1.057
Hotel & restaurant 0.053 0.107 1.055
Transport & storage 0.128 0.089 1.137
Financial services 0.497*** 0.097 1.644
Real estate 0.670*** 0.078 1.955
Public admin 0.514*** 0.091 1.672
Education −0.502*** 0.095 0.605
Health & social services −0.226** 0.083 0.798
Other services 0.613*** 0.088 1.846
Constant −2.583*** 0.243
Log Likelihood −9691.603
Variance country level 0.961*** 0.267
Variance individual level pi2=3
N level 1 = 23,234, N level 2 = 27 countries, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.




























Examining other control variables, older workers – most likely with more experience ‒
those in supervisory roles, and those with supportive managers are more likely to have
access to schedule control. Those working in job posts that are predominately populated
by men are less likely to have access to schedule control compared to posts where men
and women are equally represented, yet working in posts where women are prevalent is
far worse. Having a partner, working hours, having an open-ended contract, working in
companies with employee representatives, and the gender of one’s boss are all not
signiﬁcant in explaining workers’ access to schedule control.
Working in a public company is negatively associated with access to schedule control, which
may be because private companies are more likely to introduce new and innovative practices.
Workers employed in large companies (250+) aremore likely to have access to schedule control,
followed by medium-sized (100–249) and micro companies (fewer than 10). Small companies
(10‒99) are the ones where workers are least likely to have access to schedule control. It is likely
that medium-sized and larger companies may have more capacity to provide formal schedule
control arrangements, while micro companies use informal arrangements. However, for small
companies it may be difﬁcult to do either. Looking at sectoral variations, electricity, ﬁnancial
services, real estate, public administration and other service sectors are those where workers are
most likely to have access to schedule control. These sectors may be those where work is
organisedmoreﬂexibly, and there are fewer constraints. On the other hand, education, health and
social services sectors, alongwithmining and quarrying are theworst in providing access. This is
perhaps due to constraints coming from the nature of thework done or due to the lack of potential
performance gain that employers expect from these sectors with the introduction of schedule
control.
Country-Level Results
To address hypothesis 1, I examine the relationship between national-level family policies
and workers’ access to schedule control. The results in Table 2 show that countries with
generous family policies are those where individuals are more likely to have access to
Table 2. Multilevel model using family policies to explain workers' access to schedule control
across 27 European countries in 2010
Schedule control/modela 2–1 2–2 2–3 2–4
Country level variables
Family expenditure 0.463** 0.197
Childcare coverage 0–3 0.524*** 0.347*
Effective parental leave 0.340+ 0.263
Effective parental leave2 −0.437*** −0.267*
Constant −2.575*** −2.529*** −2.584*** −2.259***
Var. country 0.707*** 0.647*** 0.684*** 0.474***
R2 level 2 (Changes from
Model 1)
26.4% 32.6% 28.8% 50.7%
Log likelihood b −9687.558* −9686.471* −9691.601 −9682.416+
N level 1 = 23,234, N level 2 = 27 countries, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
aThe models includes all variables included in Model 1 in Table 1.
bSigniﬁcance symbols represents the signiﬁcant increase in log likelihood scores from the nested
model.



























schedule control, supporting hypothesis 1b. In countries with stronger work-facilitating
policies – i.e. childcare provision, and where family policies are generous in general – i.e.
more spending on family policies, workers are more likely to have access to schedule
control. Parental leave, representing work-reducing policies, has an inverted U-shape
relationship to workers’ access to schedule control, as shown by Evans (2002). In other
words, in countries where effective parental leave is about the European average (about a
year) workers’ access to schedule control is at its highest. However, access to schedule
control is restricted in countries where effective leave entitlements are very short or very
long (see Figures 2 and 3). Family policy variables combined explain more than 50 per
cent of the cross-national variation in the provision of schedule control (see model 2–4 in
Table 2).
Next, I examine whether national-level family policies can help explain the cross-
national variation in the division between workers of different genders, parental status,
skill and educational classes in their access to schedule control. First, we need to test
whether there are signiﬁcant cross-national variations in the slope of these variables using
random slopes models. The results show3 that for the gender gap (variance 0.036,
p = 0.099), the gap between parents and non-parents (variance 0.000, p > 0.100), and
the gap between upper-secondary educated workers vs. primary educated workers (var-
iance 0.043, p > 0.100), there are no signiﬁcant cross-national variations. However, there
are signiﬁcant cross-national variances in the gap in the access to schedule control
between tertiary vs. upper-secondary educated workers (variance 0.113, p = 0.022) and
that between high-skilled and low-skilled workers (variance 0.025, p = 0.025).
Figure2. National-level family policies and access to schedule control for low-skilled and high-
skilled workers across 27 European countries in 2010 Source: EWCS.
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Next, I examine the relevance of national-level family policies in explaining the cross-
national variation in the gaps between workers with different skill/education levels. I ﬁnd
that the additional access that workers have to schedule control in countries with generous
childcare coverage and in countries with about average levels of parental leave is mostly
driven by the additional access gained by high-skilled and more highly educated workers
(Table 3 and Figures 2 and 3). Put differently, the schedule control access gap between
high- vs low-skilled/educated workers is largest in countries with extensive childcare
coverage and about average level of parental leave. This is because high-skilled/educated
workers are much more likely have access to schedule control in these countries compared
to other countries, while the differences across countries in the access low-skilled/edu-
cated workers have are smaller.
Conclusion and Discussions
Despite the growing number of studies that deal with family policies, most cross-national
comparative analyses focus either on national-level policies or company-level provisions,
ignoring how the two levels interact. Those that do examine this relationship rarely
explore whether it varies depending on the group of workers in question, as well as
between different types of family policies, i.e. work-reducing vs. work-facilitating poli-
cies. This article tries to ﬁll this gap and contribute to the literature by examining workers’
access to one of the most prevalent forms of company-level family-friendly policy:
Figure3. National-level family policies and access to schedule control for less well educated and
more highly educated workers across 27 European countries in 2010 Source: EWCS.
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Table 3. Multilevel results using family policies to explain the varying impact of skill and educational level on access to schedule control across 27
European countries in 2010
Schedule control/model 3–1 3–2 4–1 4–2 4–3
Individual-level variablesa
Skill level 0.390*** 0.478*** 0.431*** 0.432*** 0.432***
Tertiary educated 0.491*** 0.496*** 0.372*** 0.381*** 0.548***
Country-level variables
Family policy exp. 0.411**
Childcare coverage 0.426*** 0.465***
Parental leave 0.344+ 0.318+
Parental leave2 −0.304* −0.359**
Interactions
Skill level*childcare coverage 0.059+
Skill level*parental leave −0.003





Constant −2.451*** −2.184*** −2.489*** −2.449*** −2.117***
Var. random slope 0.020* 0.010 0.091 0.091* 0.067
R2 random slope 20.9% 59.8% 19.3% 19.5% 41.2%
Log likelihood b −9675.019* −9672.287 −9673.710 −9672.739* −9672.180
N level 1 = 23,234, N level 2 = 27 countries, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10.
aThe models includes all variables included in Model 1 in Table 1.
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schedule control. The paper ﬁrst examines whether there are large gaps in the access to
schedule control across workers of different gender, parental status and skill level. Then it
goes on to examine how national family policy contexts can explain the cross-national
variation in workers’ access to schedule control using the theory of “crowding out” and
“crowding in”. It further examines whether family policies can explain the cross-national
variation in the access gap between different groups of workers.
The results show that there are large variations across different groups of workers in
their access to schedule control. Those who have greater potential to contribute to the
company, and increase their performance/work intensity, seem to have better access to
schedule control; i.e. more highly educated and skilled workers in supervisory roles are
more likely to have access. There is little support for a needs-driven provision; although
workers with preschool children are also slightly more likely to have access, there are
generally no signiﬁcant differences between parents vs. non-parents or men vs. women,
conﬁrming what has been shown in previous studies (e.g. Swanberg et al. 2005; Ortega
2009).
There is evidence that generous national-level family policies can both “crowd in” and
“crowd out” company-level provisions, depending on the type of policy. Work-facilitating
policies “crowd in” workers’ access to schedule control, conﬁrming earlier studies (Chung
2014; Lyness et al. 2012; Den Dulk et al. 2013). Work-reducing policies, however,
“crowd in” schedule control only to a certain degree and then “crowding out” effects
can be seen, similar to what was found for women’s employment patterns (Misra et al.
2011). Family policies were also associated with gaps in the access workers of different
skill and education levels had to schedule control. The additional schedule control access
found in countries with generous work-facilitating policies and about average level of
work-reducing policies was predominantly due to the additional access gained by high-
skilled/educated workers. Thus, we can argue that “crowding in” of occupational policies
seems to be targeted towards the group of workers that employers have a stake in
recruiting/maintaining, with greater potential to contribute to company performance out-
comes – i.e. the high-skilled workers. Yet employers may not feel a need to provide
schedule control to workers, both high- and low-skilled, when very long leave entitle-
ments are available, “crowding-out” occupational-level policies.
There are some points that need further investigation. Some of the relationships found
here were rather exploratory, especially the context variables included to explain the
cross-national variation in the gaps in access to schedule control between different groups
of workers. Thus the results may be sensitive towards any confounders excluded from the
analysis and future studies should examine other potential important contextual factors –
such as unemployment rates, labour market institutions, or work and gender norms.
Additionally, due to the limitation of the cross-sectional data used here, we cannot be
certain about the causality of the relationships found – e.g. countries where organisations
have a greater skill demand, managers may not only introduce generous family policies at
the company level but also demand that generous family policies are developed at the
national level (see also Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). Longitudinal data on the
use of ﬂexible work arrangements in a cross-national comparative setting will be of
beneﬁt to allow such analysis to take place. Finally, the results may be sensitive to the
period under investigation. Major austerity cuts were implemented in 2009–2010, and
similar behaviour may have occurred at the company level, which may distort our results.
Further analysis using data from different years (pre-, post-crisis) would be of beneﬁt.



























Despite these limitations, this study has shown some useful insights on the underexplored
issue of the relationship between national- and company-level policies, how this relationship
may vary depending on the actual policy type examined, and across different groups of
workers in the labour market. Firstly, an important result from this paper is that we cannot
assume an equal inﬂuence of institutions across different groups of workers (see also Chung
and Mau 2014; Chung 2016). This paper has shown the usefulness of random-slopes cross-
level interaction models to explore this issue with cross-national comparative data. Secondly,
different results are found for different types of family policies, leading us to rethink how we
conceptualise family policy, its role and its impact on work‒family outcomes (see also Misra
et al. 2011). This study provides further evidence that we need to be cautious about exactly
what we are measuring when we examine family policy indicators, especially when using
single or composite indicators. Finally, the results from this paper show that despite some
cross-national variance, generally, disadvantaged labour market groups are least likely have
access to company-level family-friendly arrangements such as schedule control (see
also Swanberg et al. 2005; Golden 2009). This is especially problematic if we consider that
these workers may be those in most need of family-friendly measures due to lack of other
resources to address the conﬂicting demands of work and family life. Policy makers should
thus explore ways to tackle this unequal access to company-level provisions of family-
friendly policies to ensure that everyone can make use of such beneﬁts. Generous family
policies at the national level may help in ensuring access for some workers, yet, as shown in
this paper, this may not necessarily guarantee access for the lower ends of the labourmarket. A
strong right to request ﬂexible working, with greater protective measures, may be better suited
to tackle this issue.
Notes
1. There are countries where workers have a right to request ﬂexible working, such as in the UK. However this
is a much softer right compared to the Dutch right to adjust working hours (WAA), where it is more difﬁcult
for employers to refuse the request. The Dutch, however, have passed a law on ﬂexible working which will
allow workers a stronger right to request ﬂexible working – e.g. working from home or schedule control ‒ as
of 2016.
2. Skill level is included as a continuous variable to enable a more simplistic random slopes model – where
several categorical variables would have resulted in a larger number of models to be tested.
3. Detailed results provided upon request.
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Appendix. Variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics
A-1. Variable deﬁnitions and data sources
1. Individual level variables
● Gender: dichotomous variable of female (male = reference group)
● Parental status
– Lives with a child under the age of 18
– Lives with a pre-school child (< 6)
● Skill-level level – Simpliﬁed categorisation of occupational groups based on the
Occupation group ISCO-88 2 digit categories
Professional/managerial
(3)
11 Legislators and Senior ofﬁcials
12 Corporate managers
21 Physical, mathematical and engineering science
professionals







31 Physical and engineering science associate professionals
32 Life science and health associate professionals
33 Teaching associate professionals




42 Customer service clerks
51 Personal and protective services workers
52 Models, salespersons and demonstrators
71 Extraction and building trade workers
72 Metal, machinery and related trade workers
73 Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers
74 Other craft and related trade workers
Low/un-skilled
(0)
61 Market-oriented skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers
62 Subsistence agricultural and ﬁshery workers
81 Stationary-plant and related operators
82 Machine operators and assemblers
83 Drivers and mobile-plant operators
91 Sales and service elementary occupation
92 Agricultural, ﬁshery and related labourers
93 Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and
transport



























ISCO-88 2 digit recoded into 4 majors groups based on Schwander and Häusermann{,
2013 #689} used as a scale variable
● Education – divided into three categories of 1) primary and lower-secondary, 2) upper-
secondary and post-secondary(reference), 3) tertiary or above
● Age – as a continuous variable ranging from 15 to 65
● Partner – whether the respondent lives with a partner
● Contract type: The contract type of the respondent is also included in the analysis
divided into those with indeﬁnite contracts coded as 1, and those without (those with a
ﬁxed term contract, a temporary employment agency contract, an apprenticeship or
other training scheme, or those with no contracts) coded as 0.
● Working hours: Working hours is measured as the number of hours worked in the
main job and is a raw score. The number of hours is capped at 60 hours a week.
● Supervisor role: Based on the question “How many people work under your
supervision, for whom pay increases, bonuses or promotion depend directly on
you?” where none was coded as 0, anything above 1 coded as 1 = having some
sort of supervisory role.
● The existence of an employee representative: “At your workplace is there an employee
acting as an employee representative?”
● Management support : “For each of the following statements, please select the
response which best describes your work situation…. Your manager helps and sup-
ports you”, and could answer from 1 –Always, 2 –Most of the time, 3 – Sometimes, 4
– Rarely, and 5 – Never. Respondents who have answered 1 or 2 for this question is
considered to have support from management.
● Woman boss: The gender of the worker’s supervisor is captured through the following
variable; “Is your immediate boss a man or a woman?” (0=man, 1=woman).
● Gender dominance of the position: Measured through the following variable: “At your
place of work are workers with the same job title as you” – the answer can range from
1 – Mostly men; 2 – Mostly women; 3 – More or less equal numbers of men and
women; 4 – Nobody else has the same job title. Two dummies are made from this
question to represent mostly female occupation and mostly male occupation.
● Size of the company: Company size is included as a categorical variable: less than 10,
10 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to 249, 250-499, 500 + employees – reﬂecting the commonly
used deﬁnition company sizes (see:
● Public sector: To distinguish those working in the public sector, the following variable
is used “Q10 Are you working in the …?” where respondents can answer, 1 – Private
sector, 2 – Public sector, 3 – Joint private-public organisation or company, 4 – Not-for-
proﬁt sector, NGO, and 5 – Other. Those who have answered 2 or 3, have been coded
as being employed in the public sector.
● Sector : Sector: NACE R.1.1, 1 digit categories: Mining and quarrying,
Manufacturing, Electricity, gas and water supply, Construction, Wholesale and retail,
Hotel & restaurant, Transport, storage and communication, Financial intermediation,
Real estate, renting and business activities, Public administration and defence,





























2. National level variables
● Institutions
○ Family policy expenditure : Family policy expenditure as a percentage of GDP for
2010 (Source: Eurostat - http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database)
○ Parental leave: effective parental leave for 2009 (duration*income replacement
rate) (source: Multilinks) – note 2009 is used since data for 2010 could not be
obtained.
○ Childcare coverage: average number of hours of childcare for age group 0-3 for
2010 derived from EU SILC data (source: Eurostat)
Independent variable summary EWCS 2010 individual level
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Female 29296 53% 0.50
Direct boss woman 28758 32% 0.47
Occupation – mostly men 29112 36% 0.48
Occupation – mostly women 29112 35% 0.48
Has a child <18 29296 32% 0.47
Has a preschool child <6 29296 14% 0.35
Has a partner 29296 66% 0.47
Employee representative 27911 46% 0.50
Management support 28070 63% 0.48
Establishment size
Less than 10 28283 32% 0.47
10-49 28283 33% 0.47
50-99 28283 12% 0.32
100-249 28283 10% 0.30
250-499 28283 5% 0.22
500 or more 28283 8% 0.27
Public company 29068 35% 0.48
Education – primary and lower secondary 29208 24% 0.43
Education – upper and post-secondary 29208 45% 0.50
Education – tertiary 29208 31% 0.46
Occupational level
Professionals/managers 29006 15% 0.35
Associate professional/managers 29006 22% 0.41
General skills/vocational 29006 42% 0.49
Low/unskilled 29006 21% 0.41
Supervisory role 28975 14% 0.35
Indeﬁnite contract 29156 79% 0.40
(continued )




























Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Sector
Mining 27976 1% 0.07
Manufacturing 27976 15% 0.36
Electricity 27976 2% 0.12
Construction 27976 7% 0.25
Retail 27976 16% 0.25
Hotel & restaurant 27976 5% 0.36
Transport 27976 7% 0.21
Financial 27976 3% 0.25
Real estate 27976 8% 0.18
Public admin 27976 8% 0.27
Education 27976 10% 0.27
Health and social services 27976 12% 0.31
Other services 27976 6% 0.25
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min max
Working hours 28793 36.94 9.94 1 60
Age 28024 41.25 11.40 15 65
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